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Abstract
The considerable effort of writing requirements is only worthwhile if the re-
sult meets two conditions: the requirements reflect stakeholders’ needs, and
the implementation satisfies them. In usual approaches, the use of different
notations for requirements (often natural language) and implementations (a
programming language) makes both conditions elusive. AutoReq, presented
in this article, takes a different approach to both the writing of requirements
and their verification. Applying the approach to a well-documented exam-
ple, a landing gear system, allowed for a mechanical proof of consistency and
uncovered an error in a published discussion of the problem.
Keywords: AutoReq, seamless requirements, Design by Contract,
AutoProof, Eiffel, Landing Gear System, specification drivers,
multirequirements
1. Overview and Main Results
A key determinant of software quality is the quality of requirements. In-
consistent or incomplete understanding of the requirements can lead to catas-
trophic results. This article presents a tool-supported method, AutoReq, for
producing verified requirements, with applications to control systems. It
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illustrates it on a standard case study, an airplane Landing Gear System
(LGS). The goal is to obtain requirements of high quality:
• Easy to write.
• Clear and explainable to domain experts.
• Amenable to change.
• Supporting traceability through close connections to later development
steps, particularly implementation.
• Amenable to mechanical verification and validation.
As the last point indicates, AutoReq includes techniques for not only
expressing requirements but also verifying their consistency. The LGS case
study illustrated the effectiveness of such verification by uncovering a sig-
nificant error in a previous description of this often-studied example (Sec-
tion 6.5).
AutoReq takes natural language requirements and environment assump-
tions as an input and converts them into a format having the above prop-
erties. The new format relies on a programming language with contracts.
This viewpoint brings one of the biggest advantages of AutoReq – it makes
the requirements verifiable both against the underlying assumptions and fu-
ture candidate implementations, while maintaining their readability through
natural language comments on the code. The present work takes the nat-
ural language statements from the LGS case study and translates them to
seamless statements, readable and verifiable. The ASM treatment of the
case study [6] provides the candidate implementation – an executable ASM
specification [22] of the system. This by no means implies applicability of Au-
toReq to ASMs only. The approach applies to any candidate implementation
that follows the small step semantics of ASMs. More precisely, the imple-
mentation should run in an infinite loop polling the system environment’s
state and sending appropriate control signals. To the best of our knowledge,
most control systems’ implementations follow this approach.
The method of expressing requirements does not introduce any new for-
malism but instead relies on a standard programming language, Eiffel, using
mechanisms of Design by Contract (DbC) [40] to state semantic constraints.
While DbC relies on Hoare logic [23], which at first sight does not cover tem-
poral and timing properties essential to the specification of control systems,
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we show that it is, in fact, possible and even simple to express such properties
in the DbC framework.
The verification part relies on an existing tool, associated with the pro-
gramming language: AutoProof [54], a program proving framework, which
can verify the temporal and timing properties expressed in the DbC frame-
work. Applying it to LGS automatically and unexpectedly uncovered the
error. Hoped-for advantages include:
• Expressiveness: requirements benefit both from the expressive power
of declarative assertions and from that of imperative instructions.
• Ease of learning: anyone familiar with programming languages has
nothing new to learn.
• Continuity with the rest of the development cycle: design and imple-
mentation may rely on the same formalism, avoiding the impedance
mismatches that arise from the use of different formalisms, and facili-
tating change.
• Precision: formal specifications (contracts) cover the precise semantics
of the system and its environment.
• Existing tools, as available in modern IDEs, that support the require-
ments process: a compiler for a typed language performs many checks
that are as useful for requirements as for code.
The present work, while not claiming to have fully reached these ambi-
tious goals, makes the following contributions:
• The outline of a general method for requirements engineering with ap-
plication to control systems.
• The use of a programming language as an effective mechanism for re-
quirements specification.
• A precisely defined concept of verifying requirements for control sys-
tems (complementing the usual concept of verifying programs). This
idea originates from [46].
• A translation scheme from temporal and timing properties to simpler
Hoare logic properties (essentially, first-order predicates on states) as
traditionally used in Design by Contract.
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• A simple way to combine environment and machine aspects (the two
components of requirements in the well-known Jackson-Zave approach).
• A direct mapping of these requirements concepts into well-known ver-
ification concepts, assume and assert.
• The demonstration that it is possible to use an existing program prover
to verify requirements.
Section 2 discusses consequences of poor requirements. Section 3 presents
LGS. Section 4 describes the methodology: how to specify and verify require-
ments. Section 5 shows how to translate common requirements patterns
(originally expressed through temporal logic, timing constraints or Abstract
State Machines) into a form suitable for AutoReq. Section 6 sketches the
methods application to the case study, including an analysis of the uncovered
error. Section 7 discusses related work, and Section 8 discusses limitations
and future work.
2. The importance of verifying requirements
Control systems in aerospace, transportation, and other mission-critical
areas raise tough reliability demands. Ensuring reliability begins with the
quality of requirements: the best implementation is useless if the require-
ments are inconsistent or do not reflect needs. Requirements for software
deserve as much scrutiny as other artifacts such as code, designs, and tests.
The literature contains many examples of software disasters arising from
requirements problems of two kinds:
• In the requirements themselves: inconsistencies, incompleteness, inad-
equate reflection of stakeholders’ needs.
• In their relationship to other tasks: design, implementation etc. may
wrongly understand, implement or update them.
Examples of the first kind include [33]:
• The year 2000, National Cancer Institute, Panama City: patients un-
dergoing radiation therapy get wrong doses because of a software mis-
calculation.
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• In 1996, Ariane 5 maiden flight fails from flight computer’s code crash,
out of an uncaught arithmetic exception, in code that was reused from
Ariane 4 but relied on assumptions that no longer hold in the new
technology.
• In 1990, a bug in software for AT&T’s #4ESS long-distance switches
crashes computers upon receipt of a specific message sent out by neigh-
bors when recovering from a crash.
Analysis of these examples suggests that the problem lies in part from the
use of different methods and of different notations for requirements and other
tasks such as implementation. This observation is a basis for the seamless
approach ([41], [56], [42], [46], following ideas in [51]), which this article
applies by using a single notation throughout.
Examples of the second kind include [55]:
• London underground system: several cases [48] of passenger deaths
from doors opening or closing unexpectedly, without an alarm notifi-
cation being sent to the train driver.
• An aerospace project [24] where 49% of requirements errors were due
to incorrect facts about the problem world.
• An inadequate assumption about the environment of the flight guidance
system, which may have contributed to the crash of a Boeing 757 in
Cali [43]. Location information for the pilot to extend the flap arrived
late, causing the guidance software to send the plane into a mountain.
These examples and others in the literature illustrate the importance of
verifying requirements. We will see that it is possible to apply to require-
ments both the concept of verification, as commonly applied to code, and
modern proof-oriented verification tools devised initially for code.
3. The Landing Gear System
To illustrate AutoReq, this article will use, rather than examples of the
authors’ own making, the LGS [12], probably the most widely discussed case
study in recent control systems literature, e.g. [52], [6], [17], [32], [36], [11],
[7].
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Figure 1: Landing set (from Boniol et al. [12]).
The Landing Gear System physically consists of the landing set, a gear
box that stores the gear in the retracted position, and a door attached to
the box (Figure 1). A digital controller independently actuates the door and
the gear. The controller initiates either gear extension or gear retraction
depending on the current position of a handle in the cockpit. The task is to
program the controller so that it sends the correct signals to the door’s and
the gear’s actuators.
The discussion will restrict itself to the system’s normal mode (there is
also a failure mode). The defining properties are the following:
R11bis: When the landing gear handle has been pushed down and stays
down, then eventually the gear will be seen extended and the doors will
be seen closed. We interpret this requirement in LTL as(handle down =⇒3(gear extended ∧ door closed)) where  stands for the always tem-
poral operator, and 3 stands for the eventually temporal operator.
R12bis: When the landing gear handle has been pulled up and stays up, then
eventually the gears will be seen retracted and the doors will be seen
closed. We interpret this requirement in LTL as (handle up =⇒3(gear up ∧ door closed)).
R21: When the landing gear handle remains in the down position, then
retraction sequence is not observed. We interpret this requirement in
LTL as (handle down =⇒ #¬gear retracting) where # stands for
the next temporal operator.
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R22: When the landing gear handle remains in the up position, then outgoing
sequence is not observed. We interpret this requirement as(handle up =⇒#¬gear extending).
We will work not directly from the original description of the LGS but
from one of the most interesting treatments of case study [6], which uses the
abstract state machine (ASM) approach and applies a process of successive
refinements:
1. Start with a ground model covering a subset of the requirements.
2. Model-check it.
3. Repeatedly extend (refine) it with more properties of the system, prov-
ing the correctness of each refinement.
The AutoReq specification discussed in the next sections starts from the
ASM ground model. Some of its features are a consequence of this choice:
• It only accounts for properties specified in the first of the successive
models in [6].
• As already noted, it only covers normal mode.
• Like the ASM model, it assumes that the only environment-controlled
machine-visible phenomenon is the pilot’s handle [28]. In the failure
mode, there might be others.
• It takes over from the ASM model such instructions as gears := RETRACTED
which posit that the control system has a way to send the gear directly
to the retracted position. This assumption is acceptable at the model-
ing level but not necessarily true in the actual LGS system.
• The ASM-to-Eiffel translation scheme (Section 5.4) ensures preserva-
tion of the one-step semantics of ASM.
4. Requirements methodology
AutoReq builds on the ideas of seamless development [41], [56], multire-
quirements [42] and seamless requirements [46]. The new focus is on require-
ments verification and reuse of previous requirements through a routine call
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mechanism. We examine in turn how to specify and reuse requirements and
environment assumptions (Section 4.1), and what it means to verify them
(Section 4.2).
4.1. Specifying requirements
Specifications in AutoReq, often in practice translated from a document
in structured natural language, take the form of contracted Eiffel routines
with natural-language comments. These routines are further consumed by:
• The verification tool. Since the routines coming out of the translation
process are equipped with contracts, they may be formally verified by
a Hoare logic based prover.
• Possible implementers of the system. The combination of a program-
ming language and natural language helps developers, who will use
the same programming language for implementation, understand the
requirements. The contracts state the semantics.
Previous publications ([42, 46]) explain the reasons for choosing this
mixed notation: unity of software construction and verification, unity of
functional requirements and code, use of complementary notations geared
towards different stakeholders.
Additional properties are specific to control systems:
• Specification of temporal assumptions and requirements.
• Specification of timing assumptions and requirements.
• Reuse of assumptions and requirements in stating new ones.
The basic notation is Eiffel. All the examples have been processed by the
EiffelStudio IDE [1], compiled, and processed by the AutoProof verification
environment. The interest of compilation is not in the generated code, since
at this stage the Eiffel texts represent requirements only, but in the many
consistency controls, such as type checking, of a modern compiler.
The requirements can and do take advantage of object-oriented mecha-
nisms such as classes, inheritance and genericity.
There is sometimes an instinctive resistance to using a programming lan-
guage for requirements, out of the fear of losing the fundamental difference
between the goals of the two steps: programming languages normally serve
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for implementation, while requirements should be descriptive. The AutoReq
approach, however, uses the programming language not for implementation
but for specification, restricting itself to requirements patterns discussed
next. The imperative nature of these patterns does not detract from this goal;
empirical evidence indeed suggests [18] that operational reasoning works well
not just for programmers but for other requirements stakeholders. An added
benefit is the availability of program verification tools, which the approach
of this article channels towards the goal of verifying requirements.
For this verification goal, there seems to be a mismatch between the
standard properties that program verification tools address and the needs of
control systems. Program verification generally relies on Hoare logic proper-
ties as embodied in Eiffel’s Design by Contract: properties of the program
state (or, for postconditions, two states). The specification of control systems
generally relies on temporal and timing requirements, involving properties of
an arbitrary number of (future) states of the system. A contribution of this
work is to resolve the mismatch, using the programming language to emulate
temporal and timing properties, through schemes described in Section 5.
4.2. Verifying requirements
Verification of AutoReq requirements relies on AutoProof [54], the prover
of contracted Eiffel programs. AutoProof is a Hoare logic [23] based veri-
fier that follows semantic collaboration [50] – a specification and verification
methodology adapting Hoare logic to specific needs of object-oriented pro-
gramming. The verification unit of AutoProof is feature with contracts.
AutoReq assumptions and requirements take the form of such features, with
natural language comments for better readability, to enable their direct ver-
ification with AutoProof.
Contracts for verification with AutoProof may be modular – visible to
the feature’s callers, and non-modular – visible only in the feature’s imple-
mentation. Modular contracts take the following forms:
• Precondition imposes obligations on the feature’s callers and benefits
the callees’ implementation.
• Postcondition guarantees benefits to the callers and imposes obligations
on the callees’ implementation.
Non-modular contracts take the following forms, going back at least as
far as ESC-Java [15]:
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• assume X end allows the verification to take advantage, at the given
program point, of property X, adding X to the set of properties that
the prover may use (assumption).
• assert X end requires the verification to establish X before going be-
yond the program point, adding X to the set of properties that the
prover must prove (proof obligation).
Both precondition and assume contracts add information to verifying
the postcondition and assert contracts, but preconditions impose verification
obligations on their own: they have to hold whenever the respective features
are called. AutoReq requirements take the form of features with non-modular
contracts because of their fundamental connection with the core requirements
engineering terminology, as discussed further. From the purely technological
perspective, AutoReq depends on the ability of AutoProof to inline callees’
non-modular contracts into the callers’ code.
As noted in the introduction, many software errors are requirements er-
rors. To avoid inconsistencies, AutoReq specifications include formal proper-
ties which can be submitted to proof tools for verification. Jackson & Zave’s
seminal work ([28], also van Lamsweerde [55]), introduced a fundamental
division of these properties:
• Environment (or domain) assumptions characterize the context in
which the system must operate. The development team has no influence
on them.
• Machine (or system) properties characterize what the system must
do. It is the job of the development team to work on them.
Although each of these two distinctions is well-known and widely used
in the corresponding sub-community of software engineering, respectively
requirements and formal verification, the existing literature does not, to our
knowledge, connect them. The present work, covering both requirements and
verification concepts, unifies them into a single distinction:
• assume E end specifies an environment assumption E.
• assert E end specifies a machine property E.
Verifying requirements in AutoReq simply means proving that all assert
hold, being permitted to take assume for granted.
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Notational convention: the above notations are for presentation. The
actual texts verified through the process reported in the next sections use
the following standard Eiffel equivalents:
• For assert X end, the notation in the actual Eiffel texts is check X
end (check is a standard part of Eiffel’s Design by Contract mecha-
nism).
• For assume X end, the Eiffel notation is check assume: X end.
The assume tag is a standard part of the notation for programs to be
verified by AutoProof. old e, in a routine body, denotes the value of
an expression e on routine entry.
The only difference with verifying programs comes from the elements
that appear between these assertions: in program verification, they may in-
clude any instructions; in requirements verification, we only permit patterns
discussed below Section 5.1. In addition, specifications include timing prop-
erties, using the translation into classic assertions described in Section 5.2
and Section 5.3.
Formal methods and notations are essential for one of the goals of this
work (precision/completeness, see Section 1), but non-technical stakeholders
sometimes find them cryptic at first sight, hampering other goals such as
readability and ease of use. The multirequirements approach [42], which
this article extends, addresses the problem by using complementary views,
kept consistent, in various notations: formal (such as Eiffel or a specification
language), graphical (such as UML) and textual (such as English). In line
with this general idea, AutoReq specifications rely on systematic commenting
conventions (somewhat in the style of Knuth’s literate programming [31]). A
typical example from the specification in the next section is
-- Assume the system
run_in_normal_mode
The second line is formal; the comment in the first line puts it in context.
Such seemingly informal comments follow precise rules. For non-expert users,
and for the present discussion, it is enough to treat them as natural-language
explanations.
5. Structuring a control system specification
The mechanisms of the preceding section enable us to write the require-
ments for control systems and verify them. Such specifications will follow
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standard patterns:
• Overall structure of programs that model control systems (Section 5.1).
• Translation rules for temporal properties (Section 5.2).
• Translation rules for timing properties (Section 5.3).
• Translation rules for ASM properties (Section 5.4).
These schemes and translation patterns are fundamental to the method-
ology because they govern the use of the programming language. While the
methodology relies on a programming language for expressing requirements,
it does not use its full power, since some of its mechanisms are only relevant
for programs. Programming language texts expressing requirements stick to
the language subset relevant to this goal.
The translation schemes of Section 5.2, Section 5.3 and Section 5.4 guar-
antee that their output will conform to these patterns. A goal for future
work (Section 8) is to formalize the input languages, timed temporal logic
and ASM, and turn the translation patterns into formal rules and automatic
translation tools.
Pending such formalization, we did not for now address the soundness of
the translation.
5.1. Representing control systems
A control system is typically (unlike most sequential programs) repeating
and non-terminating. AutoReq correspondingly uses programs of the form
from until False loop main end. The task of the requirements is then to
specify main.
The translation uses four patterns that look like Eiffel features with non-
modular (assume and assert) contracts. These patterns are not part of Auto-
Proof, but they serve as blueprints for features that AutoProof can verify. P1
and P2 (Section 5.2) are time-independent (although temporal in the sense
of temporal logic). P3 and P4 (Section 5.3) take timing into account. These
cases suffice for the examples addressed with AutoReq so far. Translation
schemes are possible for more general LTL/CTL/TPTL schemes if the need
arises in the future.
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Temporal Properties Timing Properties
Environment Assumptions P1 P3
System Obligations P2 P4
Figure 2: The map of AutoReq translation patterns.
The patterns use the Jackson-Zave distinction (Section 4.2) between de-
scribing an environment assumption and prescribing an expected system (ma-
chine) property. Specifically: P1 and P3 correspond to environment assump-
tions (respectively time-independent and timed); P2 and P4 correspond to
system obligations (with the same distinction). The Eiffel translations ac-
cordingly use assume for P1 and P3 and assert for P2 and P4. When
asked to verify an AutoReq requirement, AutoProof tries to infer the assert
statements by simulating an execution of the requirement’s body to a state
satisfying the assume statements. Figure 2 maps the patterns according to
the taxonomy of system properties used in the present article.
5.2. Translating temporal properties
In the control systems world, the starting point for requirements is often
a description expressed in a temporal logic, usually LTL [49], CTL [9], or
a timed variant such as propositional temporal logic (TPTL [4]). Even if
not using a specific formalism, they often state temporal properties such as
all future system states must satisfy a given condition or some future state
must satisfy a given condition. The LGS properties given in Section 3 are an
example.
• P1 (environment assumption)
Consider the system running in mode cs under assumption c. The LTL
formulation is (c ∧ cs).
• P2 (system obligation)
The system running in mode cs should immediately meet property p.
The LTL formulation is (cs =⇒ #p). This property constrains the
system to maintain response p whenever stimulus cs holds.
The translation scheme for P1 is:
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-- Assume the system
run_under_condition_c
do
assume
c
end
main_under_conditions_cs
end
where main under conditions cs is of the form P1 or P3. The run under conditions
routine should be used instead of the original main in all requirements that
talk about the system operating in mode c. This pattern may be useful for
encoding c in properties of the form (c =⇒ 3d).
The translation scheme for P2 is:
-- Require the system to
immediately_meet_property_p
do
main_under_conditions_cs
assert
p
end
end
where main under conditions cs is of the form P1 or P3.
5.3. Translating timing properties
Although not all approaches to requirements take time into account, tim-
ing requirements, such as the response time must not exceed 1 second, are
essential to the proper specification and implementation of control systems.
AutoReq recognizes the following timing-related patterns:
• P3 (environment assumption)
Assume the system running in mode cs spends t time units to meet
property p. The TPTL formulation is x.((cs ∧ ¬p) =⇒ #y.(p =⇒
y = x + t)). x. and y. record the current time of corresponding states
[4].
• P4 (system obligation)
The system running in mode cs should spend no more than t time units
to meet property p. In TPTL: x.(cs =⇒ 3y.(p ∧ y ≤ x+ t)).
The translation scheme for P3 is:
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-- Assume it takes t time units to take the system
from_not_p_to_p:
do
main_under_conditions_cs
if (not old p and p) then
duration := duration + t
end
end
The technique for timing system obligations of the P4 form differs from
the others by using loops as the core mechanism:
-- Require that
meeting_p_under_persistent_conditions_cs
-- never takes more than t time units:
do
from
main_under_conditions_cs
until
p or (duration − old duration) > t
loop
main_under_conditions_cs
end
assert
p and (duration − old duration)≤ t
end
end
where main under conditions cs is of the form P1 or P3. The (duration –
old duration) >t exit timeout condition ensures termination of the loop, and
assertion (duration – old duration) ≤ t checks that the timeout condition
has not been reached.
The technique for handling the timing-related patterns relies on an in-
teger, non-decreasing auxiliary variable duration. It has the same role as x
and y in the TPTL formulations. The duration variable is part of the Au-
toReq approach – not a predefined variable nor part of AutoProof. It does
not play a role in the actual execution of the system but caters to static
reasoning about the system’s timing properties. The from not p to p routine
updates the value of duration instead of using assume , which would lead to
a contradiction: the prover would detect that the variable was not, in fact,
updated, and would infer False from assuming the opposite.
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5.4. Translating ASM properties
Abstract State Machines [22], [14], [13] are a commonly used specification
formalism for control systems, and the treatment of the LGS case study in
[6] served as a starting point for this article’s own treatment of the example.
The present work does not formally prove soundness of the ASM-to-Eiffel
translation. The decision to work with the ASM treatment was motivated
by the general ASM specifications’ executability: fundamentally, they are
verifiable abstractions of infinitely running control software. Such software
may be implemented in a general-purpose programming language, and the
present article demonstrates that such a language may serve as a verifiable
abstraction of itself, in the presence of a program prover.
Below comes the ASM-to-Eiffel translation scheme. The translation scheme
omits the nondeterministic version of the ASM formalism. The original work
[22] presents “Nondeterministic Sequential Algebras” as an extension to the
basic model. As Section 1 explains, the ASM formalism serves as an imple-
mentation language example in the present discussion of AutoReq, with no
intent of covering every aspect of ASMs. Nondeterministic updates seem to
be inappropriate for implementing mission- and life-critical systems, such as
the LGS, and control systems in general. Every possible environment’s state
should be predictably handled in such systems. The ASM treatment of the
LGS, for example, does not use nondeterminism.
A basic ASM specification is a collection of rules taking one of three forms
[21]: assignment, do-in-parallel and conditional. An ASM assignment reads:
f(t1, .., tj) := t0 (1)
The semantics is: update the current content of location λ = (f, (a1, .., aj)),
where ai:{1..j} are values referenced by ti:{1..j}, with the value referenced by
t0.
The Eiffel representation for an ASM location is an attribute (field) of
the class; the representation for a location update is an attribute assignment.
The ASM do-in-parallel operator applies several assignments in one step.
Eiffel offers no native support for do-in-parallel, but it can emulate one se-
quentially without changing the behavior. The following example gives intu-
ition behind the translation idea:
a, b := max(a− b, b),min(a− b, b) (2)
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The instruction in Equation 2, when run infinitely, reaches the fixpoint in
which a contains the greatest common divisor of a and b. The Eiffel transla-
tion of this instruction is:
local
a_intermediate, b_intermediate: INTEGER
do
a_intermediate := max (a−b, b)
b_intermediate := max (a−b, b)
a := a_intermediate
b := b_intermediate
end
The generalization should be clear at this point: instead of updating directly
the locations, introduce and update intermediate local variables, and then
assign them to the locations.
The translation of an ASM conditional (if t then R else Q) is an Eiffel
conditional instruction.
The ASM-to-Eiffel translation scheme scales out to the multiple classes
case. The translation overhead in this case consists of implementing assigner
procedures for the supplier classes’ attributes. The assigner procedures will
make it possible for the clients to update the suppliers’ attributes while keep-
ing them consistent. The LGS example is simple enough to avoid the multiple
classes case, which is why the present work never applies this translation rule.
6. The Landing Gear System in AutoReq
Equipped with the AutoReq mechanisms as described, we can now see
the core elements of the AutoReq specification of the LGS example. The
entire example is available in a public GitHub repository [44].
6.1. Normal mode of execution
Execution runs in normal mode if all the parameter values are in the ex-
pected ranges and meet the system invariant. Application of the run under condition c
pattern results in the following Eiffel model of normal mode:
-- Assume the system
run_in_normal_mode
do
-- the handle status range:
assume
handle_status = up_position or
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handle_status = down_position
end
-- the door status range:
assume
door_status = closed_position or
door_status = opening_state or
door_status = open_position or
door_status = closing_state
end
-- the gear status range:
assume
gear_status = extended_position or
gear_status = extending_state or
gear_status = retracted_position or
gear_status = retracting_state
end
-- the gear may extend or retract only with the door open:
assume
(gear_status = extending_state or gear_status = retracting_state)
implies door_status = open_position
end
-- closed door assumes retracted or extended gear
assume
door_status = closed_position implies
(gear_status = extended_position or gear_status = retracted_position)
end
main
end
The first three assume express that attribute values fall into specific ranges.
The last two express the LGS invariant. Ranges, the invariant and the def-
inition of normal mode come from the original. run in normal mode is a
multiple application of the run under condition c pattern (Section 5.2). It
wraps around main to make additional assumptions before calling it.
6.2. Timing properties
The ASM treatment of the LGS case study ignores timing properties
stated in the original description. For a practical system, timing is essential;
an otherwise impeccable LGS that takes two hours to perform extend landing
gear would not be attractive. We rely on AutoReq’s timing mechanisms
of the AutoReq methodology (Section 5.3) and the from not p to p pattern
(Section 5.3). Timing values, e.g. 8 units for door closing, are for illustration
only. Each of the translations that follow are produced by applying the same
18
pattern, which is why only the first translation is accompanied by a detailed
explanation.
• It takes 8 time units for the door to close. Replacing p with door status
= closed position, and t with 8 in the from not p to p pattern yields:
-- Assume it takes 8 time units to take the door
from_open_to_closed -- position:
do
run_in_normal_mode
if (old door_status 6= closed_position and
door_status = closed_position) then
duration := duration + 8
end end
• It takes 12 time units for the door to open:
--Assume it takes 12 time units to take the door
from_closed_to_open -- position:
do
from_open_to_closed
if (old door_status 6= open_position and
door_status = open_position) then
duration := duration + 12
end
end
• It takes 10 time units for the gear to retract :
--Assume it takes 10 time units to take the gear
from_extended_to_retracted -- position:
do
from_closed_to_open
if (old gear_status 6= retracted_position and
gear_status = retracted_position) then
duration := duration + 10
end end
• It takes 5 time units for the gear to extend :
-- Assume it takes 5 time units to take the gear
from_retracted_to_extended -- position:
do
from_extended_to_retracted
if (old gear_status 6= extended_position and
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gear_status = extended_position) then
duration := duration + 5
end end
from retracted to extended will include all the previously stated assume
instructions together with main.
6.3. Baseline requirements
Section 3 introduced a set of core LGS requirements, R11bis to R22, which
we now express in AutoReq. R11bis and R21 talk about the system running
with the handle pushed down. Application of the run under condition c pat-
tern (Section 5.2) with handle status = down position for c results in the
following routine to model the required mode of operation:
-- Assume the system
run_with_handle_down
do
assume handle_status = down_position end
from_retracted_to_extended
end
run with handle down is an application of the run under condition c pattern
(Section 5.2). It calls from retracted to extended to include all assumptions
so far.
Now that the execution mode with the handle pushed down is formally
defined, it is possible to express the requirements in terms of it. Property R21
requires the controller to prevent retraction immediately whenever the handle
is pushed down. Application of the immediately meet property p pattern
(Section 5.2) with gear status /= retracting state for p yields, for R21:
-- Require the system to
never_retract_with_handle_down
do
run_with_handle_down
assert gear_status 6= retracting_state end
end
-- known as R_{21}
R11bis requires the system eventually to extend the gear and close the
door if the handle stays down. The absence of timing makes it unsuit-
able for the specification of control systems: we need to specify an up-
per bound on the time the system may spend on gear extension. That
bound is the sum of the maximal times for door closing, door opening
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and gear extension. Under earlier assumptions, this value is 25. Applying
meeting p under persistent conditions cs (Section 6.2) with gear status = ex-
tended position and door status = closed position for p, run with handle down
for main under conditions cs and 25 for t turns R11bis into:
-- Require that
extension_duration
-- never takes more than 25 time units:
do
from
run_with_handle_down
until
(gear_status = extended_position and door_status = closed_position) or
(duration − old duration) > 25
loop
run_with_handle_down
end
assert gear_status = extended_position end
assert door_status = closed_position end
assert (duration − old duration)≤ 25 end
end
-- known as R_{11}bis
Requirements R12bis and R22 talk about the system running with the
handle pulled up. Application of run under condition c (Section 5.2) with
handle status = up position for c yields:
-- Assume the system
run_with_handle_up
do
assume
handle_status = up_position
end
from_retracted_to_extended
end
The rest of the requirements can rely on the specification of the execution
mode with handle up, as we have now obtained.
R22 requires the system to prevent immediate extension whenever the
handle is pulled up. Application of immediately meet property p (Section 5.2)
with gear status /= extending state for p yields, for R22:
-- Require the system to
never_extend_with_handle_up
do
run_with_handle_up
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assert
gear_status 6= extending_state
end
end
-- known as R_{22}
R12bis requires the system eventually to retract the gear and close the
door if the handle stays up. Like R11bis, it does not include timing. The
upper bound for R12bis is the sum of the maximal times for door closing,
door opening and gear extension, 30 from earlier assumptions. Applying
meeting p under persistent conditions cs (Section 6.2) with gear status = re-
tracted position and door status = closed position for p, with run with handle up
for main under conditions cs and 30 for t yields:
-- Require that
retraction_duration
-- never takes more than 30 time units:
do
from
run_with_handle_up
until
(gear_status = retracted_position and door_status = closed_position) or
(duration − old duration) > 30
loop
run_with_handle_up
end
assert
gear_status = retracted_position and
door_status = closed_position and
(duration − old duration)≤ 30
end
end
-- known as R_{12}bis
6.4. Complementary requirements
R11bis and R12bis talk about reaching a desired state under some condi-
tions, but not about preserving it. For example, even if the gear becomes
extended and the door closed with the handle down, this situation must not
change without the handle pulled up. The following application of immedi-
ately meet property p (Section 5.2) with gear status = extended position and
door status = closed position for p captures this property:
-- Require the system to
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keep_gear_extended_door_closed_with_handle_down
do
run_with_handle_down_gear_extended_door_closed
assert
gear_status = extended_position and
door_status = closed_position
end
end
under the assumption that the doors are already closed, the gear is extended,
and the handle is down. Application of run under condition c (Section 5.2)
with gear status = extended position and door status = closed position for c
yields, for this assumption:
-- Assume the system
run_with_handle_down_gear_extended_door_closed
do
assume
gear_status = extended_position and
door_status = closed_position
end
run_with_handle_down
end
The state with the gear retracted, the door closed and the handle pulled
up should be stable without pushing the handle down. The following appli-
cation of immediately meet property p (Section 5.2) with gear status = re-
tracted position and door status = closed position for p yields:
-- Require the system to
keep_gear_retracted_door_closed_with_handle_up
do
run_with_handle_up_gear_retracted_door_closed
assert
gear_status = retracted_position and
door_status = closed_position
end
end
under the assumption that the doors are already closed, the gear is re-
tracted, and the handle is up. Application of run under condition c pat-
tern (Section 5.2) with gear status = retracted position and door status =
closed position for c yields, for this assumption:
-- Assume the system
run_with_handle_up_gear_retracted_door_closed
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do
assume
gear_status = retracted_position and
door_status = closed_position
end
run_with_handle_up
end
6.5. An error in the ground model
Contracts do not just yield expressive power: they also make automatic
verification possible in the AutoReq approach thanks to AutoProof. One of
the principal potential benefits would be to uncover errors in the require-
ments.
Our work on the LGS example shows that this benefit is not just a theo-
retical possibility. Applying the AutoReq method and tools to the published
ASM specification of the LGS system [6] uncovered an error. The verification
process applied the following sequence of steps.
Start from the ASM specification. The language in which the ASM
specification is expressed contains syntactic sugar in addition to the stan-
dard ASM operators. The first step consisted of analyzing these additional
constructs to understand how they should translate to Eiffel.
Translate it into Eiffel. This step consisted of manual translation of
the specification and the requirements to Eiffel. One can find the original
ASM specification in an online archive [39], inside the LandingGearSystem-
Ground.asm file. File ground model.e in the GitHub repository [44] contains
the result of the translation.
Verify it with AutoProof. Note that AutoProof, by default, per-
forms modular contract-based verification. AutoReq specification techniques
rely on assume and assert rather than traditional contracts. These spec-
ification techniques require tuning AutoProof command-line options. The
GitHub repository [44] with the Eiffel translation includes a readme file that
says in detail how to launch AutoProof.
Identify the error. When AutoProof reports a verification failure, it
does not point at its root cause. The last step was devoted to identifying
that cause.
The error uncovered by this procedure is subtle and revealing: The spec-
ification does not meet the R11bis requirement, which states that pushing the
handle down should lead to the gear extended and the door closed. Normally,
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Figure 3: A correctly working LGS state machine. Pushing the handle down cancels the
gear retraction process and initiates gear extension. The bottom-right box contains the
trace leading to state 15.
when the crew pushes the LGS handle down, the controller should initiate
the gear extension process. Regardless of the initial system’s state, this pro-
cess should end up correctly – so that in the end the gear is extended and
the LGS latch is closed.
There exists, however, a state from which the erroneous ASM specifica-
tion will not bring the system to the correct configuration. This state cor-
responds to a situation in which the gear has just been retracted, the door
is closing, and the crew decides to cancel retraction by pushing the handle
down. A correctly working system would cancel the retraction sequence and
initiate gear extension. State 15 on Figure 3 illustrates this situation: the
start opening outgoing action cancels the door closing process initiated by
action start closing back in state 7. The state machine proceeds with the
gear extension procedure. The erroneous ASM specification models a system
that waits for the crew to pull the handle up again to let the system complete
the gear retraction process. State 15 on Figure 4 features only one outgo-
ing transition: pulling the handle up again. Instead of canceling the door
closing process (Figure 3), the system starts waiting for the crew to pull the
handle up. Imagine a situation in which the crew tries to retract the gear
during take-off, and some physical obstacle prevents the latch from closing
completely. In this case a possible solution might be to extend the gear back,
and then try to retract it again. A real controller implemented around the
erroneous specification would make extension with the latch partially closed
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Figure 4: The erroneous LGS state machine. Pushing the handle down fails to cancel the
gear retraction process. It puts the system to waiting for the crew to pull the handle up
again. The bottom-right box contains the trace leading to state 15.
impossible.
The published Eiffel translation of the specification does not have the
error. To catch it with the AutoReq method one needs first to introduce the
error back by commenting out two lines in the open door routine of the Eiffel
translation:
when closing_state then
door_status := opening_state
and then submit routine extension duration to the AutoProof tool; the verifi-
cation will fail. The “README” file in the accompanying GitHub repository
[44] provides detailed instructions on submitting AutoReq requirements to
AutoProof. Internally, AutoProof transforms the Eiffel routine to Boogie
code and submits it to the Boogie executable [8]. The Boogie executable
converts its input to first-order logic formulae and submits them to the Z3
SMT solver [16].
AutoProof detects the error in the following major steps:
Inline the unqualified calls inside of the extension duration routine to the
level of attribute updates and assume statements.
Unroll the loop inside of extension duration. How much to unroll is a config-
urable setting; the default configuration suffices for the LGS example.
Check the assert statements based on the outcome from the Inline step.
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The intent of applying AutoReq to this example was not to look for errors
but to try out the approach, illustrate it on a widely used problem, and com-
pare it with other treatments of that problem. No error had been reported
and we did not expect to find one. To ascertain its presence, we contacted
one of the authors of the original article describing the ASM implementation.
He confirmed the presence of the error in the paper. (He also noted that the
private repository used by his colleagues and him had a correct specification.)
7. Related work
7.1. Similar studies
The ASM treatment of the LGS example comes from a collection includ-
ing other treatments [12], such as Event-B [52], [32], [36], Fiacre [11] and
Hybrid Event-B [7]. The original collection [12] discusses pros and cons of
these approaches, and the present article does not repeat that discussion.
AutoReq complements these approaches with the following:
• Language reuse: AutoReq captures temporal and timing properties in
a general purpose programming language. This will inevitably save
resources for software teams that want to apply formal methods.
• Technology reuse: AutoReq relies on AutoProof, a Hoare logic based
program prover. The original use case of AutoProof was specifying and
verifying programs according to the principles of Design by Contract.
With AutoReq, software teams can use the tool throughout the whole
software lifecycle, starting from the requirements phase.
• Specification reuse: AutoReq makes it possible to avoid copying-and-
pasting already stated assertions through the standard routine call
mechanism, familiar to any post-Assembly programmer.
• Implementation reuse: AutoReq does not require translating programs
to models and back for further formal verification. If a change in the
program breaks an AutoReq requirement, the prover will immediately
notice this.
These advantages need stronger support in the form of successful indus-
trial applications of AutoReq. Such applications may also uncover additional
problems to solve. The application of AutoReq to the LGS example discussed
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in the present article inherits the questionable assumptions (Section 3) from
the original work by Arcaini et al. Applying AutoReq to an example with
weaker assumptions would provide more evidence of its benefits.
The applicability studies will follow the present article that focuses on
illustrating the approach alone. Combining the first description of AutoReq
with its applicability studies would bear the risk of making the article difficult
to read.
7.2. Existing formalisms
Reasoning about programs, imperative and concurrent, has been the focus
of computer science researchers for decades [29], and it traces back as early
as Turing’s work [30]. Different techniques have been developed over time,
and it soon became clear that, while post facto verification can be successful
for small programs, an effective verification strategy should support and be
part of the software development itself and be fully embedded in the process.
The AutoReq method follows this idea and relies on DbC verification;
however, one should understand that DbC is not well suited for control
systems as it is. The possibility of unexpected changes in the values of
environment-controlled variables introduces the gap between DbC and con-
trol systems. Traditional DbC relies on invariant-based reasoning, on the
principle of invariant stability [50]: it should be impossible for an opera-
tion to make an object inconsistent without modifying the object. This
principle does not work with control systems because of the unpredictable
environment-controlled variables. In other words, any attempt to constrain
an environment-controlled variable through a contract will inevitably lead to
the contract’s failure.
Control systems communicate asynchronously with the environment. This
introduces another gap with DbC, which is designed from the beginning to
deal with synchronous software. For non-life-critical systems [28] one may
sacrifice the asynchrony under additional assumptions [47], but the Landing
Gear System does not fall into this category.
An interesting technique for including environment properties is the no-
tion of monitor introduced by Zave [58]. A monitor is an executable require-
ment that runs in a dedicated process and observes the system from outside
logging possible anomalies. A monitor continuously polls the state of non-
deterministic variables and checks if the system evolves accordingly. This is,
however, a run-time mechanism; in the present work, we seek requirements
techniques that lend themselves to static verification.
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The general aspiration towards sound static verification resulted in nu-
merous modeling approaches that rely on a declarative logic. Alloy [26] is
one of these declarative modeling languages, based on first-order logic, that
are used to express complex behavior of software systems. Alloy is a succes-
sor of Z [2] with its own formal syntax and semantics, that adds automatic
verification and tool support to Z specifications. A model created in Alloy
can indeed be automatically checked for correctness by using a dedicated
tool: the Alloy Analyzer, a SAT-based constraint solver that provides fully
automatic simulation and checking. Alloy is one of the tools used for require-
ments verification. There are several examples of successful applications of
the modeling languages in different fields: from pedagogical to enterprise
modeling to transportation. A list documenting some of these applications
can be found in [27].
The declarative view simplifies static reasoning, but the system will even-
tually have to physically operate. C. A. R. Hoare introduced an imperative
logic to statically reason about software way back in 1969. This invention
has been treated as a verification mechanism. We are interested in require-
ments specification notations. The recent notion of seamless requirements
[46] proposes a use of generalized Hoare triples called specification drivers
[45] as a requirements notation.
The AutoReq method steps forward by applying the idea of seamless re-
quirements to the nondeterministic setting. It empowers the operational view
of Pamela Zave on requirements with AutoProof – a Hoare logic based prover
of Eiffel programs with contracts that relies on the Boogie technology [34].
In AutoReq a requirement is a routine enriched with assume statements
capturing environment assumptions and assert statements that capture the
obligations for AutoProof corresponding to the assumptions. The resulting
method respects environment-controlled phenomena as monitors do but does
not assume the requirements to physically run. The AutoReq method will
benefit the development process even when there is no static prover like Au-
toProof: an operational requirement will become a subject to testing as a
parameterized unit test (PUT) [53]. The testing will consist in this case
of running the requirement in the simulated environment described in its
assume statements.
7.3. Timing properties
Modeling real-time computation and related requirements has been a well-
investigated matter for long [57]. Representation of real-time requirements,
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expressed in general or specific form, is a challenging task that has been at-
tacked through several formalisms both in sequential and concurrent settings,
and in a broad set of application domains. The difficulty (or impossibility) to
fully represent general real-time requirements other than in natural language
or making use of excessively complicated formalisms (unsuitable for software
developers), has been recognized.
In [38] the domain of real-time reconfiguration of systems is discussed,
emphasizing the necessity of adequate formalisms. The problem of model-
ing real time in the context of services orchestration in Business Process,
and in presence of abnormal behavior has been examined in [37] and [19] by
means, respectively, of process algebra and temporal logic. Modeling proto-
cols also requires real-time aspects to be represented [10]. Event-B has also
been used as a vector for real-time extension [25] to handle control systems
requirements.
In all these studies, the necessity emerged of focusing on specific typology
of requirements using ad-hoc formalisms and techniques and making use of
abstractions. The notion of real-time is often abstracted as number of steps,
a metric commonly used.
The AutoReq method works with the explicit notion of time distance
between events by stating operational assumptions on the environment; it
also supports the abstraction of time as number of steps through finite loops
with integer counters.
8. Conclusions and future work
The approach presented above is a comprehensive method for require-
ments analysis based on ideas from modern object-oriented software engi-
neering and the application of a seamless software process that relies on
the notation of a programming language as a modeling tool throughout the
software process. The work also introduces the notion of verifying require-
ments and shows how to use a program prover to perform the verification. In
addition, it connects fundamental concepts, heretofore considered indepen-
dent, from two different areas of research: verification (assume/assert) and
requirements (environment/machine).
The work is subject to the following limitations, also suggesting areas of
improvement:
• While the idea of seamless requirements has been widely applied, its
AutoReq development as described here needs more validation on di-
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verse examples in an industrial setting, with actual stakeholders in-
volved.
• The patterns given are not necessarily complete; here too experience
with more examples is necessary to determine if there is a need for
other patterns.
• The idea of using a programming language for requirements runs counter
to accepted ideas; while there are strong arguments supporting it, and
ample discussions in some of the OO literature, some people may still
hesitate to adopt it.
• More work is required to determine how applicable AutoReq would
be to a software process relying on technologies other than Eiffel and
AutoProof. In line with this goal, we applied AutoReq [20] to the
London Ambulance System case [3], [35] and continue working on other
examples.
• As discussed in Section 5, parts of the process may benefit from more
automation. Such further tool support is currently under development.
With these reservations, we believe that the article and the case study
demonstrate the benefits and contributions listed in the introduction and
point to a promising approach to producing and verifying effective require-
ments for control systems.
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